

Research on cross-departmental standard coordination mechanism in public governance

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Abstract

Public governance, as the core model of modern state governance, emphasizes that multiple entities, including government departments, social organizations, enterprises, and individual citizens, work together to address social problems and provide public services through the sharing of information and resources, the sharing of responsibilities, and the joint consultation of decisions, guided by common goals. With the accelerated advancement of globalization and informatization, as well as the profound transformation of government functions, cross-departmental collaborative governance has become a key strategy for improving government effectiveness and effectively addressing complex and changing social issues. As a key link in the collaborative governance framework, the cross-departmental standards collaboration mechanism is committed to promoting information sharing, resource integration, and collaborative decision-making among different departments through the formulation and implementation of a unified standards system, thereby enhancing the flexibility and effectiveness of government governance. This article first defines the relevant core concepts, then deeply analyzes the problems and challenges of the cross-departmental standards collaboration mechanism in current public governance practices, and then explores the basic principles and specific practical paths for building such a mechanism, aiming to provide useful reference and inspiration for improving the overall effectiveness of public governance.

Keywords: public governance, cross-departmental collaboration, standard coordination mechanism, government effectiveness

Competing Interests:

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1. introduction

In today's society, the challenges facing public governance are increasingly complex and intertwined. Issues such as food safety, environmental protection, and public health often transcend traditional administrative boundaries and involve the collaborative efforts of multiple government departments and non-governmental entities. For example, food safety governance not only concerns the responsibilities of market regulators but is also closely intertwined with agricultural product supervision by the agricultural and rural authorities, health risk assessment by the health authorities, and pollution source monitoring by the environmental protection authorities. Similarly, responding to public health incidents requires close coordination and efficient collaboration among multiple departments, including health, public security, transportation, and community management. However, in reality, due to historical inertia in departmental divisions of responsibility, diverging interests, and fragmented standards systems, cross-departmental collaborative governance often succumbs to the dilemmas of fragmentation and information silos. This not only hinders governance efficiency but also leads to duplication and waste of resources. The cross-departmental standards coordination mechanism is an innovative solution to this governance challenge. It aims to establish a standards system encompassing policy formulation, implementation oversight, and performance evaluation, clearly defining the responsibilities, work processes, and evaluation criteria of each participant. This will foster effective communication and collaboration between departments, break down information barriers, optimize resource allocation, and ensure the consistency and efficiency of governance actions. This article will comprehensively examine the construction logic, implementation difficulties, and optimization strategies of a cross-departmental standards coordination mechanism, moving from theoretical exploration to practical analysis, with the goal of contributing to the modernization and transformation of the public governance system.

2. The connotation and characteristics of the cross-departmental standard coordination mechanism

The cross-departmental standard coordination mechanism is the core tool for solving the problem of "fragmentation" in the modern public governance system. Its essence is to promote multiple participants such as government departments, social organizations, market

entities and the public to break down administrative barriers and interest barriers by building a unified and connected standard system, and form a governance force with consistent goals and coordinated actions. Specifically, it uses "standards" as a link to connect governance resources scattered in different fields and at different levels, and realizes the transformation from "separate governance" to "cooperative governance" by clarifying the rules, processes and evaluation standards that are commonly followed, and ultimately improves the accuracy of public services and maximizes the effectiveness of governance^[1]. The core characteristics of this mechanism are reflected in the deep integration of four dimensions:

(1) Collaborative participation of multiple entities: Break through the traditional government-led single model and allow all stakeholders to participate in the formulation and implementation of standards. For example, in urban traffic management, transportation departments, bus companies, online ride-hailing platforms, and community residents need to jointly discuss the specific standards for "bus priority during peak hours", taking into account both the fairness of road resource allocation and the actual travel needs of citizens, and avoiding policy decisions made on a whim.

(2) Seamless flow of information and resources: Unified standards eliminate "information islands" and "resource barriers" between different entities. Take interprovincial medical insurance settlement as an example. In the past, due to differences in reimbursement catalogs and diagnosis and treatment coding standards across provinces, patients seeking medical treatment in other places had to pay in advance and then return to their hometowns for reimbursement. However, through the national unified medical insurance electronic certificate standards and diagnosis and treatment item coding system, patients can settle their bills directly across the country. This is a typical example of how standards can collaboratively promote efficient resource allocation.

(3) Clear sharing of responsibility chains: Standards avoid "multiple management" or "responsibility vacuums" by clarifying the boundaries of power and responsibility of each entity. For example, in food safety governance, national standards not only stipulate the responsibilities of enterprises in the production process, but also clarify the frequency of random inspections by market supervision departments, the risk monitoring responsibilities of health departments, and even specify the self-regulatory supervision obligations of industry

associations, so that the responsibilities of each link are clearly defined and verifiable.

(4) Democratic consensus in the decision-making process: The standard-setting process itself is a process of interest coordination and consensus building. Taking the renovation standards for old residential communities as an example, the housing and construction department, the street office, the owners' committee, and the construction unit need to go through multiple rounds of consultation to balance the demands of multiple parties, such as "building safety standards," "residents' personalized needs," and "renovation cost control." The final standards can not only meet the policy bottom line but also gain the recognition of residents, thus reducing the implementation resistance from the root.

It can be seen that the cross-departmental standard coordination mechanism is not a simple "standard unification", but a reshaping of the interactive relationship between governance entities through the coordination of rules, so that coordination can be transformed from "passive cooperation" to "active linkage", and from "temporary coordination" to "institutional collaboration", ultimately realizing the systematic, holistic and coordinated nature of public governance.

3. The Real Dilemma of the Cross-Departmental Standards Coordination Mechanism in Public Governance

3.1 The standard system is fragmented and lacks uniformity

The standard setting in the field of public governance has long been characterized by "departmental dominance". Each department has independently formulated standards based on its own functions and management needs, resulting in a "fragmented" standard system and difficulty in forming a unified collaborative foundation. This fragmentation is specifically manifested in conflicts at three levels: first, differences in terminology definitions. For example, for the "public service satisfaction" indicator, the cultural and tourism department focuses on "scenic spot service evaluation", while the civil affairs department focuses on "elderly care service experience". The connotation and extension of the same concept are very different; second, conflicts in indicator calculation rules. Taking the "poverty alleviation rate of the poor population" as an example, the poverty alleviation department calculates it based on "annual income per capita exceeding 4,000 yuan", while the civil affairs department adds additional conditions such as "housing and medical insurance meeting standards", resulting in

a deviation of more than 20% in the poverty alleviation rate data of the same region; third, the implementation process is fragmented. For example, in corporate credit evaluation, the market supervision department's "dishonesty list" and the financial department's "credit blacklist" have different judgment standards, resulting in "standard conflict" when cross-departmental joint punishment, making it difficult to form a supervisory synergy ^[2]. This fragmentation not only increases the communication cost of cross-departmental collaboration, but is also likely to cause internal friction in governance. For example, in cross-regional water pollution prevention and control, upstream provinces implement the "chemical oxygen demand emission standard" of the environmental protection department, while downstream provinces use the "water quality compliance index" of the water conservancy department for assessment. The two sides blame each other for inconsistent standards, delaying the opportunity for governance.

3.2 Unclear division of responsibilities and insufficient motivation for collaboration

The unclear boundaries of power and responsibility are the core bottleneck that restricts cross-departmental coordination, and the lack of institutionalized power and responsibility standards has exacerbated this problem. In many cross-governance areas, the division of responsibilities between departments still remains at the level of "principle regulations" and lacks operational standard details. For example, in the "environmental governance around campuses", although it is clear that "the education department takes the lead and multiple departments cooperate", the division of power and responsibility of urban management, cultural tourism, public security and other departments is vague for specific issues such as "cleaning up mobile vendors" and "illegally accepting minors in Internet cafes", and the phenomenon of "departments watching each other during on-site law enforcement" often occurs. More importantly, the lack of a collaborative dynamic mechanism further weakens the enthusiasm of departments to participate ^[3]. At present, the performance appraisal of most departments is still based on "single-handed" business indicators, and the effectiveness of cross-departmental coordination has not been included in the core appraisal system, and is even regarded as an "extra burden". For example, when a provincial market supervision department jointly carried out "enterprise information sharing" with the tax department, it

needed to invest additional manpower to sort out data, but because this work was not included in the annual appraisal, the promotion efficiency was low. In addition, the risk of "joint liability" may arise during the collaboration process. Some departments choose to respond passively for fear of being "responsible for collaboration errors", forming a negative mentality of "the more you do, the more mistakes you make, the less you do, the fewer mistakes you make".

3.3 Poor information sharing and weak technical support

While the development of a "digital government" has promoted the informatization of government affairs, cross-departmental information sharing still faces the underlying problem of "unsmooth communication." The core bottlenecks lie in inconsistent technical standards and a lack of security and trust. From a technical perspective, departmental information systems are often independently developed and operated, with significant differences in data formats, interface protocols, and encoding rules. For example, the public security department maintains a centralized provincial database for population information, while the human resources and social security department maintains decentralized municipal storage for social security information. These disparate data structures require significant additional resources for format conversion during integration, even leading to data distortion. While promoting "One-stop Online Services," one province discovered that business registration information alone was in seven different formats across six departments, including industry and commerce, taxation, and quality inspection. This led to repeated verification and inefficiency during cross-departmental approvals. From a security perspective, the essence of "data barriers" stems from a lack of trust. Some departments, fearing data leakage or misuse, remain cautious about sharing information. For example, information on infectious disease patients from the health and medical department is difficult to share with community-based grid management systems due to privacy concerns. This hinders the precise targeting of key populations during grassroots epidemic prevention and control. In addition, data security standards are not unified, and some departments refuse to open data due to "unclear definition of responsibilities after sharing", forming a vicious circle of "preferring repeated collection rather than sharing and reuse", which seriously restricts the accuracy of collaborative governance.

3.4 Insufficient public participation and limited applicability of standards

The vitality of public governance standards lies in “being in line with public opinion”, but the current phenomenon of “closed-door development” in standard formulation is still prominent, resulting in a disconnect between standards and actual needs. During the standard formulation stage, public participation mostly remains at the level of “symbolic solicitation of opinions” and lacks in-depth channels for involvement ^[4]. For example, when a city formulated the “Community Elderly Care Service Standard”, it only published the draft through the government’s official website and did not organize symposiums for elderly residents, elderly care institutions and other groups. The final standard’s requirement of “home service 4 times a month” did not take into account the actual needs of “high-frequency daily care” for elderly people living alone, resulting in a service satisfaction rate of less than 50% after implementation. During the implementation stage of the standard, the lack of a feedback mechanism further exacerbated the applicability problem. After the release of most standards, there is a lack of regular channels for collecting public opinions, and even if problems are found, it is difficult to make timely adjustments. For example, the “Rural Logistics Distribution Standard” of a county stipulates “delivery to the village 3 times a week”, but villagers in mountainous areas need “delivery 5 times a week” because of “concentrated shopping on market days”. Due to the lack of a convenient feedback channel, this demand was not reflected until half a year later through a proposal from the National People’s Congress representatives, resulting in the standard being seriously out of touch with reality in the early stages of implementation and serious waste of resources. This "government-led, public passive acceptance" model makes it difficult for standards to truly respond to public concerns, and ultimately weakens the social recognition of collaborative governance.

4. Principles and paths for building a cross-departmental standards coordination mechanism

4.1 Construction principles

The construction of a cross-departmental standard coordination mechanism must rely on four core principles to form an organic whole that is interconnected and mutually supportive, laying the foundation for the scientific nature and implementation of the mechanism.

The first is the goal-oriented principle, which acts as a compass for collaborative mechanisms, emphasizing the need to set clear, quantifiable goals based on specific governance issues. This requires that goals should neither be vague statements like "improving governance effectiveness" nor be set in vain, divorced from reality. For example, in collaborative efforts to optimize the business environment, goals should be broken down into specific indicators such as "compressing the entire business start-up process to three working days" and "streamlining administrative approval documents by 50%." This allows participating departments, such as market regulators, tax authorities, and government service providers, to clearly define their actions and avoid collaboration that stalls due to vague goals.

The second principle is equal authority and responsibility. This is key to overcoming buck-passing and procrastination, requiring a detailed list of authority and responsibility to clarify the boundaries of each department's responsibilities and the scope of their authority. In cross-sector governance, it's crucial to clarify the rules of "who takes the lead, who cooperates, and who is responsible." For example, in river basin ecological protection, environmental protection departments in upstream provinces bear primary responsibility for the treatment of industrial and domestic wastewater, while water conservancy departments in downstream provinces are responsible for real-time water quality monitoring and data feedback. At the same time, upstream departments are empowered to coordinate across regions to ensure that "power must be accompanied by responsibility, and responsibility must be fulfilled," preventing the phenomenon of "cross-power struggles and mutual buck-passing."

The third is the principle of public participation, which is the core of improving the applicability of standards and requires that public needs be integrated into the entire process of standard setting. This requires not only collecting opinions through online questionnaires and community public notices, but also establishing a "substantive participation" mechanism - for example, when formulating standards for the renovation of old residential communities, organizing resident representatives to participate in the review of plans and vote on details such as parking space planning and the installation of elderly-friendly facilities, so that the standards truly respond to the "pain points of people's livelihood." When a city revised its "Community Elderly Care Service Standards," it incorporated feedback from the elderly on "the distance to the dining assistance point" and "the frequency of home service visits," which

increased the service coverage rate from 60% to 85%, confirming the role of public participation in promoting the implementation of standards.

Fourth, the principle of dynamic adjustment ensures the vitality of the mechanism and requires the establishment of a closed-loop system of "assessment-revision-optimization." Standards must be updated promptly based on changes in the governance environment and technological advancements. For example, in the collaborative governance of smart transportation, initial standards may focus on "traffic light timing optimization," but with the development of autonomous driving technology, the addition of "vehicle-road collaborative data interface standards" is necessary. In epidemic prevention and control, the shift from "lockdown management" to "precision prevention and control" measures is also the result of dynamic optimization based on the characteristics of virus mutation and transmission, ensuring that standards remain consistent with governance practices.

4.2 Practical path

4.2.1 Establish a unified standard coordination organization

The establishment of a unified standards coordination organization is a core measure to solve the fragmentation of cross-departmental standards. Its core function is to break the "department-led" standard-setting model and achieve the overall planning and coordinated promotion of public governance standards. This organization needs to have authority and cross-domain coordination capabilities. It is recommended that the higher-level government take the lead and absorb relevant functional departments, professional institutions and social representatives to form a cross-departmental standards committee to form a closed-loop management system of "decision-making-coordination-execution" ^[5]. In terms of responsibility design, the agency should focus on three key areas: first, formulate basic general standards, such as unifying the definitions of core terms in public governance (such as "public service satisfaction" and "emergency response time"), and data statistical calibers (such as "standards for identifying people in difficulty" and "quantitative indicators for project progress"), to provide a benchmark framework for various departments to formulate special standards; second, coordinate conflicts in standards between departments, establish a normalized standard conflict investigation mechanism, organize multi-department consultations on the contradictions found (such as the "statistical differences in

unemployment rates" and "conflicts in pollution control indicators" mentioned above), and form a unified plan through the principle of "priority sorting + interest balance" to avoid internal friction in governance caused by inconsistent standards; third, supervise the implementation of standards, regularly evaluate the connection between the standards of various departments and the general framework, incorporate the effectiveness of standard coordination into departmental performance appraisals, and notify and urge units that refuse to cooperate and coordinate.

Taking the public health sector as an example, the National Health Commission can jointly establish a "Public Health Standard Coordination Committee" with market supervision, drug supervision, disease control and other departments to unify basic concepts such as "emergency response level" and "close contact determination standards" on the one hand, and coordinate and resolve statistical conflicts between "vaccination data" and "infectious disease reporting data" on the other hand, to ensure that cross-departmental epidemic prevention and control standards are consistent and actions are synchronized. This overall coordination mechanism can not only avoid the waste of resources caused by repeated standard formulation, but also provide a rigid basis for cross-departmental collaboration, and fundamentally solve the governance dilemma of "going it alone" ^[6].

4.2.2 Improve the list of rights and responsibilities and the incentive mechanism

Improving the list of rights and responsibilities and the incentive mechanism is the institutional guarantee for promoting the implementation of cross-departmental standards. It is necessary to take a two-pronged approach from the two aspects of "legalization of rights and responsibilities" and "motivation" ^[7]. In optimizing the list of rights and responsibilities, the role positioning and operating specifications of each department in collaborative governance should be refined in a standardized form. For example, for the cross-departmental issue of "urban waterlogging prevention and control", the water conservancy department should be responsible for river dredging and water level monitoring, the housing and construction department should take the lead in drainage network maintenance, and the meteorological department should be responsible for issuing rainstorm warnings. At the same time, the collaborative processes such as "cross-departmental transmission of warning information within 15

minutes" and "joint disposal of waterlogging points within 30 minutes" should be refined to avoid fuzzy areas. In addition, the list should achieve "equivalence of rights and responsibilities". For example, when granting the environmental protection department the power to enforce pollution laws across regions, its responsibility to "report the law enforcement results to the relevant provinces within 3 days" should be clarified to prevent abuse of power or idle responsibility. In the design of incentive mechanisms, collaborative effectiveness needs to be incorporated into the core assessment system of departments to break the performance orientation of "going it alone". A "collaborative contribution" indicator can be set to reward departments that actively open data and cooperate efficiently, such as increasing special funds for collaborative work in the annual budget, or giving extra points in awards and commendations. For example, a province allocated an additional 20% of information construction funds to market supervision departments that performed outstandingly in "corporate credit information sharing", which effectively stimulated the enthusiasm of departments to participate in collaboration. At the same time, a fault-tolerant mechanism should be established to exempt departments from liability for mistakes made due to exploration and innovation during the collaborative process, eliminate the concerns of departments about "making more mistakes the more they do", and form a virtuous circle of "active collaboration and efficient linkage".

4.2.3 Build an integrated information sharing platform

Building an integrated information sharing platform is the technical cornerstone for breaking down cross-departmental data barriers and supporting standard collaboration. It must take "unified standards, security and controllability" as the core and rely on the "National Data Sharing and Exchange Platform" to build a digital hub that is interconnected throughout the entire process.

Specifically, the platform construction needs to achieve breakthroughs at three levels: first, unify the data standard system and clarify the format, coding and metadata specifications of the core data in the public governance field. For example, standardize the field definition and verification rules of basic data such as "enterprise basic information" and "natural person identity information" to ensure that the data of

each department are "same source, same structure and same effect" to avoid docking obstacles caused by format differences; second, standardize the interface and technical architecture, adopt open API interface design, support seamless access to the business systems of various departments, and improve the platform's carrying capacity through distributed storage, cloud computing and other technologies. For example, the "government data middle platform" built by a certain province interconnects the systems of 23 departments such as public security, social security, and market supervision through a unified interface to achieve real-time data synchronization and cross-domain calls; third, build a security guarantee mechanism, and balance sharing efficiency and information security through technical means such as data encryption, permission classification, and operation traceability. For example, set up an access whitelist for sensitive information such as "personal health data" and "enterprise trade secrets", and only allow authorized departments to call in specific scenarios. At the same time, establish a data leakage tracing mechanism and clarify the security responsibilities of each link ^[8]. Taking the "One-Stop Newborn Birth" initiative as an example, an integrated platform enables real-time sharing of data, including birth certificates from health departments, household registration from public security departments, and medical insurance enrollment from social security departments. Parents no longer need to submit documents repeatedly, reducing the number of processing steps from eight to one, fully demonstrating the role of information sharing in improving collaborative efficiency. This platform not only provides data support for cross-departmental standard collaboration but also, through technological empowerment, drives the transformation of governance processes from "serial approval" to "parallel collaboration."

4.2.4 Promote in-depth public participation in the entire standardization process

Promoting the public's deep participation in the entire process of standards is the key to improving the coordinated applicability of cross-departmental standards. It is necessary to break the traditional model of "government-led and public-passive" and build a public participation mechanism with a full chain of "formulation-implementation-optimization" ^[9].

During the standard-setting phase, diverse channels for soliciting opinions should be established to ensure that public opinion is substantively incorporated into the standard design. For example, when formulating "Urban Public Transportation Station Planning Standards," online open questionnaires could be used to collect commuters' concerns about "station spacing" and "transfer times." Community forums could also be organized to invite special groups such as the elderly and people with disabilities to provide feedback on "accessibility requirements" to prevent standards from becoming mere "paper regulations." When revising "Wet Market Layout Standards," one city incorporated feedback from merchants requesting "shorter stall spacing" and residents requesting "increased parking spaces." Ultimately, a plan was developed that balanced operational efficiency and convenience, resulting in a 40% increase in merchant satisfaction following implementation.

During the implementation phase of the standard, a regular feedback platform should be established to make public opinions the basis for dynamic optimization. A "standard implementation feedback portal" can be established through channels such as government affairs APPs and community bulletin boards, and a closed-loop management system of "accepting orders – checking – rectifying – feedback" can be implemented for issues raised by the public. For example, during the implementation of the garbage classification standard, a certain province received concentrated suggestions from residents through the "Internet + Supervision" platform that "the scheduled disposal of kitchen waste conflicts with the working hours". The province quickly coordinated with the urban management and community to adjust the disposal time period and added "off-peak disposal points", which increased the accuracy rate of garbage classification from 35% to 62% ^[10]. This full-process participation mechanism can not only make the standard more in line with people's livelihood needs, but also enhance the public's recognition of collaborative governance, changing from "I have to comply" to "I want to participate", and injecting lasting social momentum into cross-departmental standard collaboration.

5.Conclusion

In summary, cross-departmental standards coordination mechanisms, as a crucial

pillar for promoting the modernization of public governance, demonstrate significant value in promoting information sharing, resource integration, and collaborative decision-making among departments. Establishing a unified, standardized, and operational standards system can help address long-standing issues such as fragmentation and information silos, thereby enhancing the integrity and coordination of government governance. Currently, cross-departmental coordination in China's public governance still faces challenges such as fragmented standards, unclear responsibilities, and poor information flow . This article explores the implications, challenges, and approaches to building cross-departmental standards coordination mechanisms from a theoretical and practical perspective. It proposes countermeasures, including establishing a unified coordination body, improving responsibilities and incentive mechanisms, building an information platform, and engaging public participation. Despite this analysis and reflection, the research remains limited due to the complexity of public governance contexts and the highly practical nature of standards coordination. For example, insufficient attention has been paid to the diverse nature of standards coordination across different sectors and levels of government, and the dynamic adjustment mechanisms for standards in the context of technology empowerment have not been thoroughly explored. In the future, with the advancement of digital government and smart governance, cross-departmental standards coordination mechanisms will face even greater demands, urgently requiring them to become more refined, intelligent, and dynamic. How to effectively integrate emerging technologies like big data and artificial intelligence to achieve adaptive updates and precise implementation of standards still requires continuous exploration and refinement in practice. This article is merely a preliminary reflection on this topic. We hope that academics and practitioners will continue to pay attention to and conduct in-depth research to jointly promote the coordination, standardization, and modernization of my country's public governance system.

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